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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES*
M. MINNETTE MASSEY§
"The power to investigate is one of the most im-
portant attributes of Congress. It is perhaps also the
most necessary of all the powers underlying the legisla-
tive function. The power to investigate provides the
legislature with eyes and ears and a thinking mechan-
ism. It provides an orderly means of being in touch
with and absorbing the knowledge, experience and
statistical data necessary for legislation in a complex
democratic society. Without it the Congress could
scarcely fulfill its primary function."1
There is little to cavil with in this statement as a
declaration of purposes. However, the fact remains that
there is much widespread concern abroad today regarding
the use of this "necessary" device of Congressional
activity, and serious question as to just how "orderly"
it is, and how far much of it is actually involved in the
fulfillment of Congress' primary function-namely, legis-
lation.
Serious thinkers throughout this land of ours have
given much time and consideration to Congressional
*This article was prepared as a paper for a course in "Law and Politics:
Congressional Investigations (Seminar)" given in the 1956 Summer Program
for Law Teachers at New York University School of Law by Sidney Davis,
of the New York Bar.
§Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Law Librarian, University of
Miami, School of Law. Lycoming College, A.A. 1947., B.B.A. 1948, LL.B.
1951, M.A. 1952, University of Miami; post graduate, University of Fribourg,
Switzerland, 1950.
'Fulbright, Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Legislative
Process, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 421, 441 (1951). For a recent book on Congressional
investigations, see TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS (1955).
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investigations for the past decade or so, particularly
insofar as investigation of subversive activities are con-
cerned. There is much here for all thoughtful Americans
to be concerned about, and especially in Congressional
investigations as they bear upon individual liberties.
The object of this article is to consider the investiga-
tive function of Congress as it affects and is affected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the Bill of Rights' corner-stone of individual liberties.
I.
SOURCE AND EXAMPLES OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
TO INVESTIGATE
The investigatory powers of Congress, as is well-known,
are derived by implication from the grant of "all legisla-
tive power" in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Pursuant to this power there have been through the
years a succession of Congressional inquiries, and legisla-
tion, and investigations directed at subversives.
A. Early Congressional Inquiries.
Congressional investigations are almost as old as the
Congress itself. The disaster of the St. Clair Expedition
against the Indians was the subject of the first investiga-
tion in 1792, only three years after the Congress had been
established. Similarly, controversy over the use of the
investigatory power of Congress is of long standing.
Inquiry into John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry in 1860
set off a great furor, both within the legislative halls and
without. In attacking the process, Senator Charles
Sumner said:
"I know it is said this power is necessary in aid of
legislation. I deny the necessity. Convenient at times,
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
it may be; but necessary never.... an alleged necessity
has, throughout all time, been the apology for wrong. "2
Nonetheless, Congress has gone merrily on through
the years investigating. The "Teapot Dome" investiga-
tions during the 1920's received considerable public
approbation, but even these inquiries into the scandals
of the Harding administration were severely criticized.
"The senatorial debauch of investigations-poking
into political garbage cans and dragging the serews of
political intrigue-filled the winter of 1923-24 with a
stench which has not yet passed away. .... ,,3
B. Legislation Directed at "Subversives."
Almost from the beginning of this nation, the threat
of subversive activity has been of concern to Congress.
In 1798, Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts,
which authorized the President to deport all aliens
regarded as dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States and made it a criminal offense to publish
false, scandalous, or defamatory writings with intent to
discredit the government, and sundry other "seditious"
purposes.4  Thomas Jefferson pardoned all persons im-
prisoned under the Sedition Act when just after the turn
of the nineteenth century he became President in 1801,
and the Act expired shortly thereafter.5
The twentieth century, in times of both war and peace,
has witnessed especially wide congressional concern re-
garding "subversives." With the entrance of the United
States into World War I, Congress in 1917 and 1918
'CONG. GLOBs, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., Pt. 4, 3007 (1860).
3Wigmore, Legislative Power to Compel Testimonial Disclosure, 19 ILL. L.
Rnv. 452-3 (1925).
4Acts of June 25 and July 14, 1798, 1 STAT. 570, 596.
'CHAF9R, FREIC SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1941).
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enacted the so-called Espionage and Sedition Acts, and
some 1,900 persons were prosecuted for various activities
defined as crimes that in some way interfered with, or
criticized, the war effort of the United States.6 In 1940,
Congress passed the first peace-time sedition law since
the infamous Sedition Act of 1798-the Alien Registra-
tion (or Smith) Act. One of the provisions of this Act
makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to teach or
advocate the overthrow of government by force or
violence, or to help organize or to become a member of
any organization so teaching or advocating the overthrow
of government.'
More recently in 1950, the Internal Security (or
McCarran) Act was passed by Congress over a presi-
dential veto. This Act was aimed at outlawing or curbing
a wide variety of activities by Communists or other
"totalitarians," and is most notable for the section
requiring registration with the government of all Com-
munist and Communist front organizations and the
individual members of the former.'
C. Investigations Directed at "Subversives."
In 1919, disturbed by certain reports of Bolsheviki
activities, the Senate ordered an investigation of Bolshevik
propaganda. The report of this subcommittee, however,
dealt largely with a description of the workings of the
Russian government, designed primarily to show "what
the application of Soviet doctrine would mean in this
country." 9
'Acts of June 15, 1917 and May 16, 1918, 40 STAT. 217, 553; the 1918 law
was repealed in 1921. The 1917 law is confined to wartime offenses and is
still in effect.
754 STAT. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
sPublic Law No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 23, 1950).
95. Doc. No. 61, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. (1919).
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Subversive activities bore little of the brunt of Con-
gressional investigating power during the 1920's, but in
May, 1930, Congress overwhelmingly adopted a resolu-
tion calling for an investigation of communism. This
action was caused by sensational charges that the Amtorg
Trading Corporation was disseminating Communist propa-
ganda in this country.'" The Congressional investigative
committee found that the charges against Amtorg were
not supported by evidence, and that the Communist
movement in the United States was pitifully weak. On
the other hand, its recommendations were drastic, and
designed "to suppress the Communist Party in the United
States, root, lock, stock and barrel."" No action was
taken on the recommendations, however.
After the rise of Hitler, in 1934, the House of Repre-
sentatives created a special committee to investigate the
extent and objects of Nazi propaganda and the diffusion
of subversive propaganda in the United States. 2 The
committee found little cause for alarm over the fascism
and communism in this country. Its recommendations
were enacted into law-the McCormack Act, passed in
1938, which required registration of agents of foreign
governments disseminating propaganda in the United
States."
Then also in 1938, the resolution which has served to
the present day as the directive upon which the work of
the Un-American Activities Committee has been based,
was adopted. The Dies resolution provided for a com-
mittee to investigate the extent, character, and objects
of Un-American propaganda activities in the United
1072 CONG. REc. 9390 (May 22, 1930).
"OGDEN, THE DIus COMMITTEE 24 (2d ed., 1945).
1278 CONG. Ruc. 4934 (April 20, 1934).
"152 STAT. 631 (1938), 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1952).
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States and the diffusion within the United States of sub-
versive and un-American propaganda of foreign or
domestic origin, that attacks the principles of the form
of government as guaranteed by our Constitution. 4
The investigation which followed was intended
originally to last only seven months, but it continued
until 1944 when the life of the Dies Committee expired
with the 78th Congress. However, in January 1945, the
House of Representatives adopted a proposal that the
investigation of un-American activities be made a per-
manent one, and the present standing committee was
created. The language of this resolution was almost
identical with that of the original resolution creating the
Dies Committee in 1938, and was carried over without
change into the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
which gave the committee further recognition as a
standing committee of the House of Representatives.
Throughout the years, since its creation in 1945, the
major interest of the Un-American Activities Committee
has been the Communist Party and the alleged subversive
activity of its members and fellow travelers.
II.
PURPOSES Olt CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
Generally speaking, the investigating power of Con-
gress may validly be used for three purposes:
(1) As a means of supplying Congress with accurate
and detailed information essential to intelligent exercise
of its express constitutional powers-particularly the
enactment of laws.
(2) To supervise or check work of administrative
agencies which Congress has charged with law enforce-
ment duties.
1483 CONG. Ruc. 7567-86 (May 26, 1938).
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(3) To influence public opinion by giving circulation to
facts or ideas.
Regarding the primary or first enumerated informa-
tional function of Congressional investigations, Woodrow
Wilson said, "The informing function of Congress should
be preferred even to its legislative function."'"
In addition to the three purposes, the investigating
function may be employed for any of three possible
motives:
(1) Personal publicity and advancement,
(2) Party advancement or embarrassment to the other
party, or
(3) Desire to expose alleged unlawful or improper con-
duct by specific individuals, both public servants and
private citizens.
The only purpose or motive that has been given formal
approval by the United States Supreme Court is the
purpose of supplying Congress with information needed
to carry on its legislative function. 6 With purposes and
motives as broad as these six, it can readily be appreciated
that the investigating power of Congress easily lends
itself to abuse.
III.
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox, in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein."' 7
"WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVE9RNMENT 297-303 (1885).
'6McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173 (1927).
17W. Va. State Board v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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Thus spake the Supreme Court in 1943. Can it be that
circumstances have occurred to the Court which permit
an exception, since that time?
A. Rights in General of Witnesses Called Before Investiga-
tive Committees of Congress.
With the ever-growing "illusion of investigative om-
nipotence,"18 the prime issue today-from the standpoint
of the individual-is what defenses, if any, does he have
against this illusion? Truly, are the only rights a witness
has, the rights given to him by the investigating com-
mittee? In this regard, many thoughtful Americans have
paused to wonder whether the right to exercise the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment lies at the
foundation of free government by free men,19 or whether
these rights have been abrogated insofar as Congressional
investigating power is concerned.
It has been said that "the prevailing opinion in Con-
gress has been that the first ten amendments do not
protect parties before committees since these proceedings
are only inquiries and bear no relation to court pro-
cedure."0
It is true that this illusion has been somewhat dispelled
in the opinion in United States v. Rumely,2 ' but the fact
remains that the average citizen gets much less con-
sideration than the "lady from Toledo, ' 2 even when he
is entirely willing to cooperate with the investigating
committee and "tell all" about his own activities.
18 TAYLOR, op. cit supra note 1 at 58-88.
"Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
20Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish
Contempts of its Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. Ruv. 887, 888 (1952).
21345 U.S. 41 (1953).
"2Ibid. 58 (Mr. Justice Douglas concurring opinion).
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B. Right of Committee Witness to Refuse to "Incriminate"
Others. 3
What, if any, protection does the First Amendment
afford the witness who wishes to cooperate fully with the
investigating committee regarding his own activities and
those of persons he knows to be Communists, but who
seeks to reserve the right to remain silent regarding
persons whom he is sure have long since removed them-
selves from the Communist movement?
Apparently the recusant witness must act at his own
peril. He is faced with the unenviable task of determining
whether the investigation is, or might be, in pursuit of a
legitimate Congressional objective; whether the specific
query is "pertinent" to that legitimate objective.24 Then,
he must decide whether his refusal to answer is privileged,
and weigh this privilege against his general duty to
testify2 -which, of course, is not a matter ultimately for
the witness to decide,- but initially is for the committee to
resolve and ultimately for the court to determine.26
Depending upon the purpose of the investigation, there
will be some varying restrictions on the right of silence
before a Congressional committee, and the degree of such
restriction will depend upon the magnitude of the evil.
That magnitude will probably determine which of three
purpose tests will be applied by the courts. So, in refusing
to answer, the witness is further called upon to decide for
23In addition to application of the First Amendment, consider also the pro-
visions of the Fifth Amendment, and see GRISWOLD, THU FIFTH AMUNDMUNT
TODAY (1955).
4Gilligan, Congressional Investigations, 41 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 618,
623 (1951).
21 U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
26Townsend v. U.S., 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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himself whether there is a clear and present danger,
a probable danger, or an ultimate danger."
It is unquestionably true that ultimately the decision
rests with the court to determine whether the witness has
any choice in regard to answering or refusing to answer
the committee's questions. However, the witness is none-
theless instantly perched on the horns of an imposing
dilemna-he must decide for himself whether he can, in
all conscience, answer the questions of the committee,
or whether the First Amendment, or any other factor,
relieves him of this obligation. Some members of Congress
feel that the "relative necessity of the public interest"
outweighs private rights at this time. However, public
interest in private rights has also increased. More and
more, thoughtful people are deeply concerned about the
underlying basic freedoms. Let us consider one facet of
the problem.
C. Right of Committee Witness to Refuse to Testify in
Response to Questions H1e Regards as not Pertinent.
If an individual is convinced that there is a danger and
believes that he has information that will aid the govern-
ment in combatting the evil; he is completely willing to
appear before a Congressional committee and divulge.
everything he knows about the Communist Party, his
activities and the activities of others whom he believes
are still active in the Party; and he has waived iny
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment; does the individual have the right to ques-
tion the pertinence of certain questions or their con-
stitutionality under the First Amendment? Basically,
these are the questions involved in John T. Watkins v.
27Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. U.S., 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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United States. 8 The only questions Mr. Watkins refused
to answer related to persons with whom he had been
associated many years before, whom he believed were no
longer associated with the Communist movement, in-
formation, incidentally, which the committee already had
in its possession. Watkins was indicted under 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 for refusal to answer questions of a subcommittee
of the Committee on Un-American Activities and was
found guilty in the District Court. This decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeals on the grounds that
questions intended to expose past members or past
affiliates of the Communist movement are not, in the
absence of a legislative purpose, pertinent to the matter
under inquiry. 9
En Banc, on rehearing, the Court reversed this ruling
and held that the questions were pertinent to a valid
legislative purpose and were authorized by the Act.30 It
refused to accept the contention of Watkins, and of the
previous hearing, that the sole purpose of the committee
was exposure, stating: "Congress has power of exposure
if the exposure is incident to the exercise of a legislative
function. Congress certainly has the power of inquiry or
of investigation when the inquiry or investigation is upon
a subject concerning which Congress may legislate. The
fact that such an inquiry or investigation may reveal
something or "expose something is incidental and without
effect upon the validity of the inquiry."
Perhaps the most shocking statement made by the
Cou~t of Appeals in reversing on rehearing-at least to
this writer-was that "a legislative inquiry may be as
2824 U.S.L. Week 2329 (D.C. Cir., June 13, 1955).
2924 U.S.L. Week 2329 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 26, 1956).
2 5John T. Watkins v. U.S. 233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 1956). Cert.
granted 25 U.S.L. Week 3093 (Oct. 9, 1956). For a similar situation consider
the recent refusal of Arthur Miller to furnish the name of "other" persons.
19561
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broad, as searching, and as exhaustive as is necessary to
make effective the Constitutional powers of Congress. "31
IV.
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND
THE RIGHTS OF COMMITTEE WITNESSES
"Freedom of speech is not what it used to be in America.
It has been so abused that it is not exercised by others."3
Courts, too, have shown that they are reluctant to inter-
fere with the fundamental power of a legislature to inform
itself. Except in decisions on the Fifth Amendment, the
judiciary has done little to curb the "Inquisition."3 To
denounce the whole program as suicidal nonsense involves
a risk few care to take. Yet as a nation, we are committed
to what we generally term "certain basic freedoms." So
basic-it might be noted-that Alexander Hamilton
argued that there wa's no need for a constitutional Bill
of Rights.
Our Bill of Rights rejects the philosophy that political
and religious controversies should be regulated in the
public interest. It leaves no room for regulation. It says
the government shall make "no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion-no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise of religion-no law . . . abridging the freedom of
the press-no law abridging . . . the right of the people
peaceably to assemble-no law abridging ... the right of
the people to petition the government for a redress of
grievances." The essence of our Bill of Rights is tolerance
for all shades of opinion, persecution for none. Under
our way of life a man should never go to jail for what he
3"John T. Watkins v. U.S., supra note 30 at 687.
2Address by Senator Margaret Chase Smith, 96 CONG. Ric. 7894 (1950).
"3Bischoff, Constitutional Law and Civil- Rights, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 54, 68
(1954), republished in 1954 ANNUAL SURVUY op AMRRICAN LAW 54, 68 (1955).
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thinks or espouses. He can be punished only for his acts,
never for his thoughts, or beliefs, or creed.
As a people, we are united on the essential principle
that each should have the freedom of his own conscience,
the right to advocate his own faith, the right to worship
his God in such manner as he chooses. We are, in other
words, tolerant of diversities among men; we are respect-
ful of schools of thought and schools of politics that
oppose us.3
4
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States
has, through the years, substantiated these beliefs and
protected them when they have been endangered.
The right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by
the First Amendment "lies at the foundation of free
government by free men" and we must in all cases
"weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise .. . the
reasons . . . in support of the regulation of the free
enjoyment of the rights.) 35
"Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion,
not public opinion by authority. . . . We can have
intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diver-
sities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the
price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes
... freedom to differ is not limited to things that do
not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ
as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."3"
It is sometimes argued that government may make
some laws abridging our basic freedoms. Freedom of
speech and press does not protect disturbances of the
public peace or the attempt to subvert the government.
'
4 Douglas, The Manifest Destiny of America, THn PROGRESSIVI, Feb.,
1955, p. 7.
"Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
36Supra note 17 at 641, 642.
17Gitlow v. U.S., 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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Nor is one free to yell "fire" where there is a "clear and
present danger" that his words will bring about a sub-
stantive evil that Congress has the right to prevent. This
latter statement redounds with ambivalent reasoning.
Like the twin-headed Janus, Justice Holmes here espoused
the free-market-place-of-ideas creed of our founding
fathers on the one hand, and at the same time seems to
have decreed that words which might be uttered in times
of peace may so inflame men in time of war that no court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right on the other hand. 8 Yet this sort of ambivalence
pervades the judiciary today, unfortunately. The "clear
and present danger" has been watered down to "when
danger is reasonably represented as potential," at least
insofar as the investigatory power of Congress is con-
cerned. 9
Judicial review, itself a limitation on popular govern-
ment, is a fundamental part of our constitutional scheme.
But to the legislature, no less than to courts, is committed
the guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties.40 But to
the people, no less than to the government, is committed
the ultimate protection of our basic rights. For the
freedom to follow his conscience, Socrates drank of the
hemlock. For freedom to worship as they chose, Christian
martyrs faced the lions in the arena. For writing "may
moral virtue be the basis of civil government," David
Brown spent two years in jail for sedition until pardoned
by President Jefferson. And so it goes. For refusing to
"Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3 9Barsky v. U.S., 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948). For a critical discussion
of Court of Appeals decision in the Barsky case and the Second Circuit decision
in U.S. v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948),
see Editorial Note, Congressional Power of Investigation and Freedom of Speech,
with reference to the Un-American Activities Committee, 17 CIN. L. RHv. 264-76
(1948).
40Supra note 17.
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divulge the names of man who had paid only passing
interest to the Communist movement to a committee
bent on exposure, John T. Watkins was fined for con-
tempt of Congress.
V.
UNDESIRABILITY OF COMMITTEE DETERMINATION OF
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
One of the foremost students of free speech in this
country, Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., has observed
that legislative investigating committees are eminently
suited to pass on general questions and badly suited for
the decision of individual cases.41 Congress was not
designed to determine whether an individual is innocent
or guilty of crime or other conduct. That is what courts
are for. Congress sits to make laws for everybody and to
supervise administrative methods for everybody. It is
not its business to pass judgment on one man-except by
impeachment.
A legislative committee conducting an investigation of
of an explosive problem, inevitably, is engaged in politics.
42
The result is that frequently the individual is exposed to
public scorn, embarrassment, and often loss of employ-
ment.
VI.
COMMITTEE PUBLICITY CONCERNING WITNESSES'
UNPOPULAR ACTIVITIES AND OPINIONS
Congress has power of exposure, said the Court in the
Watkins case, if the exposure is incident to the exercise
of a legislative function. 3
41BARTH, THE LOYALTY O FREE MEN, Foreword xii (1950).
41GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 23 at 46.
43233 F.2d 681, 687 (C.A.D.C., 1956).
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The cost of this system of punishment by publicity
entails sacrifices not only for the individual who becomes
involved in it, but also, on a wide scale, for the society
as a whole. If all the elements of due process can be thus
evaded, the personal security of individuals in the United
States from arbitrary or summary punishment becomes a
fiction. One result is to heighten the general insecurity
of which this evasion of constitutional safeguards is a
symptom.
The Court of Appeals in the Watkins case stated that
it would be quite in order for Congress to authorize a
committee to investigate the rate of growth or decline of
the Communist Party and, as a part of this inquiry, that
it would be pertinent to such an investigation to inquire
as to whether thirty persons were Communists between
1942 and 1947.44
Watkins stated explicitly that he would answer any
questions regarding his own activities and those of indi-
viduals who were still active in the Communist Party,
but that he was unwilling to answer questions regarding
the activities of persons who had long since departed from
any party influence. It is, therefore, rather difficult to
comprehend the relevance of these individuals' activities
from 1942 to 1947 in relation to the authority to identify
present believers and belongers to the Communist Party;
also, what relation possible party membership in 1942-
1947 has to do with "labor unions found to be communist-
infiltrated" in 1954.45
As Judge Edgerton stated in his dissent in the Barsky
case: "This Court now holds that the First Amendment,
which restricts the express power of taxation, does not
44Id. 4-5. The court did not find that Congress had authorized such an
investigation, but merely that it would be in order to so authorize.
"68 STAT. 775, 50 U.S.C. § 841; 24 U.S.L. Week 2497, 233 F.2d 681,
686 (C.A.D.C., 1956).
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restrict the implied power of investigation. Investigation
in general, and this investigation in particular, is not
more necessary than taxation. There is no basis in
authority, policy, or logic for holding that it is entitled
to a preferred constitutional position."4
According to the doctrine enunciated in the De Jonge
case, the right of expression-belongs to every man regard-
less of his past, present or future, except for statements
that transcend constitutional limits. 7 Yet this investiga-
tion restricts the freedom of speech by uncovering and
stigmatizing expressions of unpopular views. The com-
mittee gives wide publicity to its proceedings. This
exposes the men and women whose views are advertised
to risks of insult, ostracism, and lasting loss of employ-
ment.
41
CONCLUSION
To speak or not to speak is a fundamental right, the
exercise of the right to speak being, of course, specifically
protected by the First Amendment. To think or not to
think is likewise a basic attribute of human beings, and
the result of the exercise of their rationality or irration-
ality, the capacity for which is distinctive in man as
opposed to other beings. On the other hand, the Congress
needs information in order to legislate in a wise fashion,
48167 F.2d 241, at 253 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
'
7 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
48New York Times, Jan. 6, 1956, p. 6, col. 7. The Daily News dismisses
reporter, Wm. A. Price; Wm. A. Price, a reporter who had been in the employ
of the News for 15 years and who served his country as a naval aviator during
World War II, was discharged solely on the basis that his "usefulness" to the
News was "destroyed" because he objected to the Eastland Committee hearings
on the grounds of the First Amendment and refused to testify. For an excellent
recent article on investigation of newspapermen, authors and others, see
Dembitz, Congressional Investigation of Newspapermen, Authors, and Others in
the Opinion Field: Its Legality Under the First Amendment, 40 MINN. L. Rov.
517 (1956).
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and thus to seek to maintain domestic peace and order
necessary to progress. Both the individual and Congress
must transmit their rights to speak and think and to
develop legislative information into deeds and acts, if
they are to perform effectively their respective functions.
The problem presented by the Watkins case is how to
balance the Congressional power to investigate with the
rights of the individual to think and particularly to speak.
One approach that has been suggested is for Congress
to adopt Codes of Fair Investigatory Procedure which
would clearly enunciate ground rules to be followed by
the members of investigating committees and particularly
would clarify the rights and obligations of witnesses
appearing before it. In this regard, two observations
might be made. First, such a code would only be effective
so long as the individual members rigidly followed it;
second, even though such a code were devised, Congress
need only be bound by it so long as it suited its purposes
,and could readily modify or revoke the code at will. For
these reasons, among others, it appears fairly obvious
that a Code of Procedure is not the ultimate answer to
the problem.
The basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution are
no more absolute than the authority of Congress to
restrict these freedoms for the sake of the national
security. For this reason, the Supreme Court is not
likely to lay down any hard and fast rules on the subject.
It will, however, examine each case in the light of its
particular circumstances and apply the rule laid down in
1821-that Congress shall exercise "the least power
adequate to the end proposed." Recognizing that an
element of exposure will, of course, result from all such
inquiries, the Court must nevertheless examine, re-define
and curtail the absolute right and power of exposure
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insisted upon in this instance 'and sanctioned by the
Court of Appeals.
As pointed out by Chief Judge Edgerton in his dissent
in the Watkins case, "Words and conduct of the Com-
mittees... go far to confirm the inference that its purpose
on this occasion was exposure."
Mr. Velde, Chairman of the Committee in the 83rd
Congress, has indeed stated: "We feel that we have a
duty ... to inform the people who elected us about sub-
versive activities ....
The error of these legislators is that in conducting
Congressional investigations they have shown insufficient
regard for individual liberties. They confuse loyalty with
orthodoxy. Acting upon this confusion, they have tended
to suppress diversity and in effect to insist upon a rigid
conformity. The national loyalty of free men is not so
much to their government as to the purposes for which
their government was created."
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the Constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."'"
40Supra note 43, at 692-93.
"°BARTH, op. cit supra note 41 at 3.
"'Marshall, C.J., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
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